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Note 
 
Maximizing the Min-Max Test: A Proposal To 
Unify the Framework for Rule 403 Decisions 
Leah Tabbert* 
In United States v. Jamil, evidence expert and Federal Dis-
trict Judge Jack Weinstein was squarely hoisted by his own pe-
tard.1 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied a 
test that Weinstein’s own treatise helped promote2 to reverse 
Judge Weinstein’s evidentiary ruling.3 Using Rule 403 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, Judge Weinstein had suppressed an 
audio recording of the defendant speaking to some business as-
sociates.4 Rule 403 provides that the trial judge “may exclude 
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue de-
lay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evi-
dence.”5 In reviewing the decision, the Second Circuit declared 
that it must “look at the evidence in a light most favorable to 
its proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing 
its prejudicial effect.”6  
This is the min-max test, as propagated in Judge Wein-
stein and Professor Margaret Berger’s treatise on evidence 
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2016, University of Minnesota Law School. I am grate-
ful to Professor Brad Clary for his thoughtful guidance. I also want to thank 
Sharon Kortenhof and Brad Tabbert for their unwavering love and support. 
Copyright © 2016 by Leah Tabbert. 
 1. 707 F.2d 638, 638–39 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 2. E.g., 1 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EV-
IDENCE ¶ 403[03] (1975) (Rel. 56-6/96); see also infra Part I.D. 
 3. Jamil, 707 F.2d at 642–45.  
 4. Id. at 641.  
 5. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 6. Jamil, 707 F.2d at 642. 
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law.7 The application of the min-max test has spread to most 
circuits since Jamil but has split into varying manifestations.8 
As this split continues to expand and deepen, the time is ripe 
for a unification of the treatment of Rule 403 balancing tests. 
This Note is the first to independently review the application of 
the min-max test in the federal courts. 
Rule 403 has been called the “cornerstone” of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence9 and “the trial judge’s friend.”10 But some 
have criticized the rule for the “unbridled discretion” it affords 
to trial judges.11 The broad applicability of Rule 403 magnifies 
its scope; the rule applies to virtually every piece of relevant ev-
idence.12 The steep threshold for exclusion under Rule 403, jux-
taposed with the expansive language of its neighbor, Rule 402,13 
establishes a strong presumption of admissibility.14 This pre-
sumption is consistent with the so-called “liberal thrust” of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.15 Courts and scholars agree that 
Rule 403 was designed to be used sparingly, as an exceptional 
remedy for uniquely dangerous or problematic evidence.16 Yet 
this same desire for flexibility and facts-driven application mo-
 
 7. E.g., 1 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2; 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & 
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 403.02[2][d] (2d ed. 
1997) (Rel. 112-3/2015); see also 22A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. 
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5221, at 350 n.26 (2d ed. 
2005). 
 8. See infra Part I.D. 
 9. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Preju-
dice in Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used To Resurrect the 
Common Law of Evidence?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 879, 906 (1988).  
 10. William O. Bertelsman, What You Think You Know (but Probably 
Don’t) About the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Little Knowledge Can Be a Dan-
gerous Thing, 8 N. KY. L. REV. 81, 86 (1981). 
 11. E.g., 22A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5214, at 172 (“[S]ome 
readers will conclude with us that the Advisory Committee’s attempt to struc-
ture discretion to check ‘unbridled discretion’ has failed . . . .”). 
 12. See infra Part I.A. The rules do include a narrow exception to Rule 
403. Some forms of prior criminal convictions evidence, produced to impeach a 
witness’s character for truthfulness, must be admitted regardless of Rule 403 
balancing. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2); see, e.g., United States v. Collier, 527 F.3d 
695, 700 (8th Cir. 2008) (reaffirming that Rule 403 does not apply to evidence 
admissible under Rule 609(a)(2)). 
 13. FED. R. EVID. 402 (“Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the 
following provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; 
these rules; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.”). 
 14. See, e.g., United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 15. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993); 
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988).  
 16. E.g., United States v. Stone, 702 F.2d 1333, 1340 (11th Cir. 1983); 
United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d at 707; Imwinkelried, supra note 9. 
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tivated the courts to impose only abuse of discretion review for 
evidentiary decisions, including those based on Rule 403.17 
Abuse of discretion is a highly deferential standard of review by 
which the appellate court will uphold the trial judge’s decision 
unless it was clearly abusive, irrational, or arbitrary.18 
Thus, Rule 403 embodies two discrete interests in eviden-
tiary law: a liberal presumption of admissibility and a broad 
deference to trial court discretion. When the trial court declines 
to exclude evidence under Rule 403, these interests are in har-
mony. In the eyes of the reviewing appellate court, the pre-
sumption of admissibility and deferential abuse of discretion 
review both lead to the same result: affirming the ruling.19 
When the trial judge employs Rule 403 to exclude evidence, 
however, these interests may clash.20 Judges who apply their 
discretion to overstep the boundaries of Rule 403 may be 
shielded from reversal by the forgiving standard of review.21 
When Rule 403 is employed to exclude evidence, which interest 
should win out?  
This Note posits that, when they conflict, Rule 403’s pre-
sumption of admissibility should trump deference to discretion. 
Further, the best way to achieve that aim is through universal 
and unequivocal adoption of the min-max test, the application 
of which is fragmented and variable under the status quo. Part 
I introduces Rule 403, its competing interests, and the circuit 
split surrounding the min-max test. Part II critiques trial court 
discretion as implicated by Rule 403 and identifies the circum-
stances in which deference to discretion clashes against the 
presumption of admissibility. Part III isolates the min-max 
test’s role in resolving the internal tension of Rule 403 deci-
sions. It concludes that Rule 403 ought to be amended to ex-
pressly incorporate the min-max test, such that it governs deci-
sion-making at both the trial and appellate levels. A universal 
and explicit application of the min-max test would strike the 
 
 17. 22A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5212, at 149–52; see also 
United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984); Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645, 
658 (1878). 
 18. E.g., United States v. Kelley, 305 F. App’x 707, 707 (2d Cir. 2009) (cit-
ing United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 110 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
 19. See infra Part II.B. 
 20. See Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, 74 IOWA L. REV. 413, 413 (1989). 
 21. See United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 59 (1st Cir. 2013) (de-
scribing abuse of discretion review as permitting reversal “[o]nly rarely—and 
in extraordinarily compelling circumstances”). 
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most favorable balance between the competing interests of ad-
missibility and deference in the application of Rule 403.  
I.  RULE 403 IN PRINCIPLE   
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence serves as a 
broadly applicable method by which a trial judge may exclude 
relevant evidence. While its lopsided balancing test creates a 
strong presumption of admissibility, the abuse of discretion 
standard of review for evidentiary decisions operates to protect 
most trial judge evidentiary decisions from appellate reversal. 
To reconcile these interests, most circuits have applied some 
variation of Weinstein and Berger’s min-max test. Section A 
surveys the relevance rules of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
and outlines the elements of Rule 403. Section B describes Rule 
403’s strong presumption of admissibility and the policies un-
derlying it. Section C similarly examines the deference associ-
ated with abuse of discretion review for Rule 403 decisions. Fi-
nally, Section D introduces the min-max test, its history, and 
the circuit split in its application. 
A. THE RELEVANCE RULES 
The Federal Rules of Evidence dramatically simplified evi-
dence law in the United States. The Rules were drafted over 
the course of eleven years, from 1961 to 1972, by a committee 
appointed by Chief Justice Earl Warren of the Supreme 
Court.22 Intended to provide for prompt and economic ascer-
tainment of truth,23 the rules “deemphasize technical objections 
to admissibility and emphasize the discretion of the trial 
judge.”24 The drafters succeeded in reducing “what eventually 
took Wigmore nine volumes of text . . . to what Chairman [of 
the Advisory Committee Albert] Jenner called ‘a handy pam-
phlet.’”25  
This scaling back reduced the relevance requirement to a 
mere handful of rules.26 Rule 401 broadly defines relevant evi-
 
 22. See Bertelsman, supra note 10, at 85; see also 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, 
supra note 7, § 5006, at 171. 
 23. FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules should be construed so as to adminis-
ter every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and 
promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth 
and securing a just determination.”). 
 24. Bertelsman, supra note 10.  
 25. Mengler, supra note 20, at 427. 
 26. FED. R. EVID. 401–415. 
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dence as evidence having “any tendency to make a fact more or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence” when the 
fact is “of consequence in determining the action.”27 Rule 402 
declares that relevant evidence is admissible unless the rules 
or governing law specifies otherwise.28 These two rules create a 
simple presumption of admissibility for relevant evidence, dis-
placing those doctrines, such as remoteness and collateralness, 
which permitted exclusion of evidence that was only loosely at-
tached to a fact at issue.29  
Rule 403 and the rest of the relevance rules temper the 
broad definition of relevant evidence by identifying circum-
stances in which the disproportionate risk or disadvantage of a 
piece of evidence merit its exclusion. Rule 403 is the most wide-
ly applicable of these relevance exclusions and encapsulates the 
main purposes of evidence law by weighing the right of a party 
to make proof against the interests of fairness and economy.30 
The remaining relevancy rules, often called the special rele-
vance rules, address a set of narrow circumstances for balanc-
ing probative value and prejudice. Rule 404, for example, issues 
a blanket prohibition on evidence of a person’s character or 
personality trait when offered to prove action in accordance 
with that trait.31 The reasoning behind the rule is that a jury 
tends to give character evidence more weight than it deserves, 
such that the evidence is usually too prejudicial to justify its 
minimal probative weight.32 Thus, the federal rules preempt 
the 403 balancing that a trial judge might otherwise conduct 
for character evidence; outside a narrow set of exceptions, the 
rules assume that the balance requires the exclusion of charac-
ter evidence. 
 
 27. FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 28. FED. R. EVID. 402. 
 29. See Andrew K. Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 220, 262–65 (1976). 
 30. FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the fol-
lowing: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue de-
lay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). See 
generally 22A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, §§ 5212–5213 (describing the 
policy and scope of Rule 403).  
 31. FED. R. EVID. 404.  
 32. Id. at advisory committee’s notes (“Character evidence is of slight pro-
bative value and may be very prejudicial. It tends to distract the trier of fact 
from the main question of what actually happened on the particular occasion.” 
(citation omitted)).  
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Unlike the special relevance rules, Rule 403 applies to eve-
ry piece of evidence, with the idiosyncratic exception of evi-
dence of a witness’s prior crimes involving dishonesty.33 Rule 
403 spells out a complex balancing test with a weighted scale.34 
 On one side of the scale, the judge must place the probative 
value of the evidence, a measure that goes beyond mere rele-
vance.35 In a broad sense, probative value is a measure of the 
worth of the evidence to its proponent; probative value encom-
passes the evidence’s tendency to support or undermine a ma-
terial fact, but also accounts for the importance of that fact to 
the proponent’s case.36 Additional considerations along this side 
of the scale include the availability of alternative evidence of 
the same fact37 and the persuasiveness or strength of the evi-
dence.38  
On the opposite side of the scale, the trial judge must place 
the disadvantages of the proposed evidence: unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting 
time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.39 These six 
factors could be divided into two categories: evidence that sug-
gests the wrong conclusion (because of the “danger” of preju-
dice, confusion, or misleading the jury), and evidence that mis-
uses the court’s time (because of “considerations” of time waste, 
delay, or unnecessarily cumulative evidence).40 Because neither 
party has too significant of a stake in the exclusion of overly 
cumulative or time-consuming evidence, most strongly disputed 
 
 33. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2). 
 34. See 22A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5214, at 169 (“[T]he prop-
er balancing requires thought. If the lawyers do not work their way through 
this complexity, the judge will probably not master it on his own.”). 
 35. See Dolan, supra note 29, at 233. 
 36. Id.  
 37. See, e.g., Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174, 183–84 (1997); 
22A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5214, at 170. 
 38. While the trial judge should not weigh the credibility of witnesses 
when making a Rule 403 decision, Imwinkelried, supra note 9, at 884–89, im-
mediate impressions about the strength of the evidence unavoidably contrib-
ute to the measure of its probative worth, see 22A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra 
note 7, § 5214, at 168–69. 
 39. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 40. See 22A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5211, at 138–39. In fact, 
the earliest version of Rule 403 was bifurcated along these lines. See id. 
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Rule 403 decisions turn on a balance of prejudice, confusion, or 
tendency to mislead against probative value.41  
To briefly sketch the outlines of each of these dangers, 
prejudice might be defined as a general tendency to suggest de-
cision on an improper basis, such as bias, inferential misstep, 
or emotion.42 Confusion of issues results when the inferential 
path from the evidence to a permissible and relevant conclusion 
is bizarre or attenuated.43 Finally, evidence with a tendency to 
mislead the jury could be described as evidence that is “seduc-
tively persuasive,” inviting greater weight than it is reasonably 
due.44 These three factors are different flavors of the same con-
cern, though, and are often lumped together by the courts.45 
Further, defining prejudice is inherently difficult because Rule 
403 is designed to be applied flexibly to unexpected sources and 
forms of challenging evidence.46 For the purposes of this Note, 
“prejudice” as measured in the min-max test will be considered 
to encompass the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusing the is-
sues, or misleading the jury.  
When a judge considers the weight of the prejudice side of 
the Rule 403 balance, she attempts to peek into the mind of the 
juror, to anticipate improper inferences or decisions that might 
result from exposure to the disputed evidence.47 The judge con-
siders the demographics of the jury and their answers to voir 
dire questions to anticipate any prejudices or biases that the 
proposed evidence could trigger.48 The judge must then esti-
mate the likelihood that the jury will draw an improper infer-
ence from the evidence, as well as the degree of damage that 
such an inference would inflict upon the party asserting preju-
dice.49 Finally, Rule 403’s advisory notes encourage the trial 
 
 41. Cf. id. § 5218, at 317 (“The Advisory Committee’s policy supports giv-
ing lesser weight to the ‘considerations’ than to the ‘dangers.’ The ‘dangers’ 
threaten the integrity of the court’s factfinding while the ‘considerations’ only 
impair its efficiency.”). 
 42. See Victor J. Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion To Exclude Prejudicial 
Evidence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 59, 63 (1984). 
 43. See Dolan, supra note 29, at 241–42. 
 44. Id. at 242. 
 45. See id. at 240–42. 
 46. See id. at 239–40 (“It would be a mistake . . . to compartmentalize 
one’s thinking about prejudice. Counsel have shown extraordinary skill in con-
juring up new ways to smear the opponent or to present themselves as ‘widows 
and orphans.’” (citation omitted)). 
 47. See 22A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5214, at 170. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See Gold, supra note 42, at 84. 
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judge to consider whether a special jury instruction might miti-
gate the perceived prejudicial risk of the evidence.50 After eval-
uating factors on each side, the judge must determine whether 
the prejudice outweighs the probative value and, if so, whether 
the disparity may be properly characterized as “substantial.”51 
Even if the prejudicial impact substantially outweighs the pro-
bative value, the trial judge retains the discretion to admit the 
evidence anyway.52  
B. THE PRESUMPTION OF ADMISSIBILITY  
The presumption of admissibility is apparent from the 
plain language of Rule 403 and from the realities of the 
weighted balancing test. That the prejudicial impact outweighs 
the probative value of a piece of evidence is not enough to ren-
der it excludable. The prejudicial impact must be unfair, and it 
must substantially outweigh the probative value.53 The trial 
judge has discretion to exclude the evidence only if it fails to 
meet a balancing test that is pre-weighted towards admissibil-
ity.54 For this reason, courts have regarded the rule as provid-
ing an “extraordinary” remedy to be used “sparingly.”55  
Several pragmatic interests underlie the inclusion of such 
a strong presumption of admissibility in Rule 403. The rule is 
meant to address the unique circumstance where evidence is 
dangerous in some way that has not been specifically addressed 
or anticipated by the drafters, or where evidence “of scant or 
cumulative probative force [is] dragged in by the heels for the 
sake of its prejudicial effect.”56 In this way, Rule 403 operates 
like a catch-all: the other rules of evidence should adequately 
address most evidence that a party could seek to admit, but 
Rule 403 covers the wild cards. In Commonwealth v. Serge, for 
 
 50. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s notes. 
 51. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 52. Id. (“The court may exclude relevant evidence . . . .” (emphasis add-
ed)); see also Dolan, supra note 29, at 232. This discretion, of course, has 
boundaries. See infra Part I.C. 
 53. FED. R. EVID. 403; see also United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 767 
(3d Cir. 1978). 
 54. E.g., Dolan, supra note 29, at 232. 
 55. United States v. Joseph, 530 F. App’x 911, 922 (11th Cir. 2013) (“The 
mere fact that evidence will damage the defendant’s case is not enough. The 
evidence must be unfairly prejudicial.”); see also, e.g., PBM Prods., L.L.C. v. 
Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 124 (4th Cir. 2011) (commenting on the 
rarity of the usage of the remedy, which Congress intended); Imwinkelried, 
supra note 9. 
 56. United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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example, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied a state 
evidence rule modeled on Rule 403 to evaluate the admissibility 
of a computer-generated reenactment, something that the 
drafters of the rule had little reason to anticipate.57 Applying 
Rule 403 to this novel courtroom technology, the court deter-
mined that the animation was admissible.58 Because Rule 403’s 
weighing mechanism encapsulates the essential aim of the fed-
eral rules, to preserve maximum admissibility while avoiding 
undue prejudice to parties, courts can apply Rule 403 to novel 
or otherwise challenging evidence that the federal rules did not 
otherwise anticipate.59 
Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has cited the protec-
tion of narrative integrity as a reason to preserve highest pos-
sible admissibility in Rule 403 decisions.60 Narrative integrity 
is a party’s freedom to tell an entire story at trial without con-
spicuous gaps or omissions that could arouse the suspicion of 
the jury.61 The interest of preserving narrative integrity can 
give a piece of evidence “force beyond any linear scheme of rea-
soning.”62  
Finally, the presumption of admissibility demonstrates 
trust that the jury is capable of overcoming certain degrees of 
prejudice. As one California judge said in the context of admis-
sion of gruesome photos under Rule 403, “[M]any . . . tend to 
underestimate the stability of the jury. A juror is not some kind 
of a dithering nincompoop . . . exposed to the harsh realities of 
life for the first time in the jury box.”63 The Federal Rules of Ev-
idence as a whole tend to put more evidence before the jury 
than the common law did, and Rule 403 embodies that tenden-
cy.  
 
 57. 896 A.2d 1170, 1182–87 (Pa. 2006). The Pennsylvania Rules of Evi-
dence, like many state schemes, borrow extensively from the federal rules. 
See, e.g., Grady v. Frito Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1051 (Pa. 2003). 
 58. See Serge, 896 A.2d at 1187. 
 59. See 22A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5212, at 154–59. 
 60. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187–89 (1997). 
 61. See id. 
 62. Id. at 187. 
 63. People v. Long, 113 Cal. Rptr. 530, 536 (Ct. App. 1974). But see Dolan, 
supra note 29, at 226 (“The misdecision goal [of Rule 403] recognizes that 
judges must deal with the inevitable biases of jurors against classes of people, 
particular phenomena, and the like.”). 
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C. THE PRINCIPLE OF DEFERENCE TO DISCRETION 
Appellate courts have applied abuse of discretion review to 
evidentiary rulings since long before the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.64 In theory and practice, abuse of discretion is a highly 
deferential standard; Judge Maurice Rosenberg has character-
ized judicial discretion as “a right to be wrong without incur-
ring reversal.”65 Even when the reviewing court disagrees with 
the outcome of the trial court’s balancing, it must affirm unless 
it determines that the trial judge has acted irrationally or arbi-
trarily.66 One state court, applying a parallel rule, went as far 
as to hold that the appellate court must find the trial judge 
manifestly unreasonable in order to reverse a Rule 403 deci-
sion.67 Generally, an appellate court will overturn the trial 
court’s Rule 403 decision “[o]nly rarely—in extraordinarily 
compelling circumstances.”68 An empirical study comparing ap-
pellate reversal rates based on several factors, including the 
standard of review, found that the application of one or more 
deferential standards (in this study, abuse of discretion and/or 
clear error) caused the reversal rate to drop from 31% to 14–
22%.69 The high deference of the abuse of discretion review will 
usually provide adequate grounds for appellate affirmation of 
Rule 403 decisions. 
Employing a deferential standard of review for evidentiary 
rulings serves several purposes. First, it preserves judicial 
economy. A trial judge might make hundreds of evidentiary rul-
ings before and during a trial, and stringent review of those de-
cisions would impose a significant burden on judicial re-
 
 64. See Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U.S. 645, 658 (1878) (“Cases arise where it 
is very much a matter of discretion with the court whether to receive or ex-
clude the evidence; but the appellate court will not reverse in such a case, un-
less the ruling is manifestly erroneous.”). 
 65. Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed 
from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 637 (1970). 
 66. E.g., United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 110 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 67. State v. Martin, 699 P.2d 486, 490 (Kan. 1985) (“Judicial discretion is 
abused when judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable, which is 
another way of saying that discretion is abused only when no reasonable per-
son would take the view adopted by the trial court. If reasonable persons could 
differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot 
be said that the trial court abused its discretion.”). 
 68. United States v. Devin, 918 F.2d 280, 286–87 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[Rule 
403] determinations are, within wide parameters, grist for the trial judge’s 
mill.”). 
 69. Robert Anderson IV, Law, Fact, and Discretion in the Federal Courts: 
An Empirical Study, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1, 24–25. 
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sources.70 Further, rigorous review of evidence decisions would 
necessitate promulgating rules with more detailed guidance for 
the trial judge, and thus more hair-splitting than the federal 
rules’ “handy pamphlet” approach allows.71 Second, the trial 
judge faces the difficult prospect of making on-the-spot deci-
sions that comport with the unique circumstances of the case. 
The appellate court, viewing only the cold record, would strug-
gle to put itself precisely into the shoes of the trial court at the 
time of that decision.72 In addition, trial judges may be better 
prepared to make these decisions than appellate judges, be-
cause they conduct trials on a regular basis.73 Finally, the lower 
rates of reversal from deferential review preserve institutional 
legitimacy, morale among lower court judges, and a sense of fi-
nality for litigants.74  
D. THE MIN-MAX TEST CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger’s treatise is fre-
quently cited as support for the Rule 403 min-max test, which 
requires that evidence be viewed “in the light most favorable to 
its proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing 
its prejudicial effect.”75 The min-max test’s bias toward admis-
sion “results from the general thrust of the federal rules in fa-
vor of admissibility.”76  
The min-max test is, or has been, applied in most circuits, 
but significant variations have emerged in two areas. The first 
area of variation is at the appellate level: whether the test is 
 
 70. See Kelly Kunsch, Standard of Review (State and Federal): A Primer, 
18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 11, 29 (1994). 
 71. Mengler, supra note 20, at 427. Compare id., with Anderson, supra 
note 69, at 46 (“The cost of formulating detailed rules about procedural and 
evidentiary matters exceeds the benefit, so deference here is a form of rational 
abstention.”), and Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Subcomm. 
on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d 
Cong. 91 (1973) (statement of Edward W. Cleary, Advisory Comm. on Rules of 
Evidence, Judicial Conf. of the U.S.) (“Style would strike a middle course be-
tween vague generalities and constricting particularity . . . .”). 
 72. See Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 384 (2008); 
Devin, 918 F.2d at 286–87; Mengler, supra note 20, at 414. 
 73. See Kunsch, supra note 70, at 19–20; see also United States v. Long, 
574 F.2d 761, 767 (3d Cir. 1978). 
 74. See Kunsch, supra note 70, at 19–20. 
 75. E.g., United States v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359, 361 (6th Cir. 1979) (citing 
1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE § 403(03) (1977)). 
 76. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE 
MANUAL STUDENT EDITION § 6.02[2], at 6-23 (9th ed. 2011); see also Beech 
Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988). 
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applied to evaluate Rule 403 exclusions in addition to admis-
sions. A minority of circuit courts of appeals has only applied 
the min-max test when reviewing decisions to admit evidence, 
while most circuits also apply the test when reviewing Rule 403 
exclusions. The second source of variation is which courts are 
bound to apply the test. A minority of circuits explicitly binds 
district courts, as well as appellate courts, to the min-max test, 
while the majority of circuits applies the test only in appellate 
review. The circuit split on both of these dimensions deepens as 
time goes on, creating a different version of Rule 403 in each 
circuit. The interests of unity in application of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence favor resolving this split before the gap wid-
ens further. 
1. Recognition of the Min-Max Test 
Four circuits have never applied the min-max rule to Rule 
403 decisions. The Courts of Appeals for the First,77 Eighth,78 
and Ninth79 Circuits have not applied the min-max test in any 
capacity. They employ no built-in minimums or maximums in 
the weighing test, and evaluate the evidence by weighing an es-
timation of the probative value against an estimation of the 
prejudicial impact.80 The Third Circuit is fairly unusual among 
federal circuits in that it has applied an alternative to the min-
max test, which one might describe as a “middle-max” test.81 
The middle-max test “places on one side [of the equation] the 
maximum reasonable probative force for the offered evidence,” 
and on the other side of the equation, “the likely prejudicial im-
pact of the evidence.”82 This test places less emphasis on the 
presumption of admissibility, because it affords the foreseeable 
prejudicial impact of the evidence greater weight in the balanc-
ing test than the min-max test would. The Third Circuit has 
 
 77. E.g., Espeaignnette v. Gene Tierney Co., 43 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(“The question is not whether we would strike the balance differently in the 
first instance, but whether the balance actually struck is so egregiously one-
sided that it requires reversal.”). 
 78. E.g., United States v. Counce, 445 F.3d 1016, 1018 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(applying a simple abuse of discretion review to uphold the lower court’s ex-
clusion of relevant evidence under Rule 403). 
 79. E.g., United States v. Wiggan, 700 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 2012) (cit-
ing United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2000)) (reviewing the 
lower court’s Rule 403 weighing with “considerable deference”). 
 80. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
 81. Coleman v. Home Depot, Inc., 306 F.3d 1333, 1344 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 82. Id. (emphasis added in first) (citing FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
MANUAL 242 (Stephen A. Saltzburg et al. eds., 7th ed. 1998)). 
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only applied this test in one case, however, so the middle-max 
test is more an intellectual curiosity than a circuit-wide prece-
dent.83  
The remaining circuits—the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh—have applied the min-max test 
in at least some circumstances.84 The District of Columbia and 
Federal Circuit both have applied the min-max test, but not in 
recent years.85  
The history of the min-max test as applied in the federal 
courts begins in the Sixth Circuit, with United States v. Green.86 
In Green, the Sixth Circuit considered a trial court’s admission 
of expert testimony in a drug manufacturing conspiracy trial. 
The government had offered, and the trial judge admitted, ex-
pert testimony of the hallucinogenic and psychological effects of 
the controlled substance that the defendant was charged with 
producing.87 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit resolved to “follow the 
‘better approach’ recommended by United States District Judge 
Jack B. Weinstein and Professor Margaret A. Berger in their 
treatise” and “tip the scales in favor of the proponent of the evi-
dence by seeking to maximize its legitimate bearing upon the 
issues while minimizing its potentially abusive overtones.”88 
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion by admitting testimony on the “bizarre physiological ef-
fects” of the drug because the testimony “did not tend to prove a 
conspiracy charge” and “could only serve to prejudice the ju-
ry.”89  
The Sixth Circuit reiterated the importance of the min-max 
test by applying it again in United States v. Brady, citing to 
 
 83. See id. 
 84. E.g., United States v. Lopez, 649 F.3d 1222, 1247 (11th Cir. 2011); 
Shepard v. Dallas Cty., 591 F.3d 445, 457 (5th Cir. 2009); Deters v. Equifax 
Credit Info. Servs., 202 F.3d 1262, 1274 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1106 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v. Rubin, 37 F.2d 
49, 53 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Moore, 917 F.2d 215, 233 (6th Cir. 
1990); United States v. Khorrami, 895 F.2d 1186, 1194 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 85. See Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(applying the min-max test to uphold lower court’s exclusion); United States v. 
Moore, 732 F.2d 983, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (applying the min-max test to up-
hold lower court’s admission); United States v. Day, 591 F.2d 861, 878–79 
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (applying the min-max test to reverse lower court’s exclusion). 
 86. 548 F.2d 1261, 1268–70 (6th Cir. 1977). 
 87. See id. 
 88. Id. at 1268. 
 89. Id. at 1269. 
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Green and Weinstein in the opinion.90 From the early Sixth Cir-
cuit adoption, the min-max test slowly spread to most of the 
other circuits. Several courts adopted the test by citing to 
Brady,91 while others cited to Weinstein directly.92 Most circuits 
recognize and apply the min-max test, but the application of 
the test varies in two ways: direction of ruling and level of 
court. 
2. Direction of the Ruling 
The first variation among circuits that apply the min-max 
test is the direction in which they apply it to review district 
court decisions. This variation comes to play only at the appel-
late level, after a trial judge has issued a ruling on a Rule 403 
objection. Among the circuits that apply the min-max test, a 
minority has never applied the test to review a lower court’s 
decision to exclude evidence. This minority consists of the Sev-
enth Circuit and, probably, the Fourth Circuit. Though the 
Seventh Circuit employs the min-max test in review of chal-
lenged Rule 403 admissions,93 it has not applied the test to re-
view challenged Rule 403 exclusions.94 The Fourth Circuit has 
only very recently applied the min-max test to exclusions.95 Re-
luctance to apply the test to exclusions is perhaps understand-
able, as the min-max test necessarily minimizes the likelihood 
that the balancing will support exclusion. This creates tension 
 
 90. 595 F.2d 359, 361 (6th Cir. 1979). 
 91. See United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1106 (4th Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Finestone, 816 F.2d 583, 585 (11th Cir. 1987); United States 
v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Brown, 688 F.2d 
1112, 1117 (7th Cir. 1982).  
 92. See United States v. Moore, 917 F.2d 215, 233 (6th Cir. 1990); K-B 
Trucking Co. v. Riss Int’l Corp., 763 F.2d 1148, 1155 n.9 (10th Cir. 1985); F & 
S Offshore, Inc. v. K. O. Castings, Inc., 662 F.2d 1104, 1107–08 (5th Cir. 1981); 
United States v. Day, 591 F.2d 861, 878–79 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 93. E.g., United States v. O’Brien, No. 92-2451, 1993 WL 288371, at *2 
(7th Cir. July 29, 1993).  
 94. E.g., McCarty v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554, 1559 (7th Cir. 
1987) (“Where as [sic] here the judge explains the reasoning process behind 
his exclusions, they will rarely be overturned.”). 
 95. Until 2013, the Fourth Circuit applied the min-max test as its “defer-
ential review of Rule 403 admissions.” United States v. Nwanze, No. 92-5415, 
1993 WL 375787, at *3 (4th Cir. Sept. 24, 1993) (emphasis added). In E.I. 
DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Industries, 564 F. App’x 710 (4th Cir. 
2013), however, the circuit considered the minimum prejudicial effect of the 
proposed evidence to reverse an exclusion. Id. at 715. It is too soon to tell on 
which side of the split the Fourth Circuit belongs. 
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with the abuse of discretion standard of review, which will be 
explored below.96  
The majority of federal circuit courts of appeals applying 
the min-max test uses it to review district court Rule 403 deci-
sions in either direction. The Second,97 Fifth,98 Sixth,99 Tenth,100 
and Eleventh101 Circuits have applied the min-max test in Rule 
403 review of both exclusions and admissions by the lower 
court. Interestingly, the Third Circuit’s sole application of the 
middle-max test was in review of a Rule 403 exclusion.102 At the 
appellate level, a small minority of min-max circuits has yet to 
apply the test to review lower court exclusions. 
3. Level of Application 
A few circuits have specifically identified the min-max test 
as a duty of the trial court as well as the appellate court. This 
trial and appellate application split emerged more recently and 
is likely to continue developing. The Tenth Circuit was the first 
to split. In Deters v. Equifax Credit Information Services, the 
circuit held that, because “the district court is clearly in a supe-
rior position to perform [the min-max test],” the appellate court 
would afford it broad discretion in that decision.103 The Fourth 
Circuit has cited Deters to hold that “[w]hen a district court 
 
 96. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 97. United States v. Rubin, 37 F.3d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying the 
min-max test to uphold lower court’s admission); United States v. Jamil, 707 
F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying the min-max test to reverse lower 
court’s exclusion). 
 98. Shepard v. Dallas Cty., 591 F.3d 445, 457 (5th Cir. 2009) (applying the 
min-max test to uphold lower court’s admission); United States v. Schmidt, 
711 F.2d 595, 599 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying the min-max test to uphold lower 
court’s exclusion). 
 99. United States v. Moore, 917 F.2d 215, 233 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying 
the min-max test to uphold lower court’s exclusion); Finch v. Monumental Life 
Ins. Co., 820 F.2d 1426, 1432 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying the min-max test to 
uphold lower court’s admission). 
 100. United States v. Roberts, 417 F. App’x 812, 820–21 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(applying the min-max test to uphold lower court’s admission); SEC v. Peters, 
978 F.2d 1162, 1171 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying the min-max test to reverse 
lower court’s exclusion). 
 101. Aycock v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 769 F.3d 1063, 1066 (11th Cir. 
2014) (applying the min-max test to reverse lower court’s exclusion); United 
States v. Dodds, 347 F.3d 893, 897 (11th Cir. 2003) (applying the min-max test 
to uphold lower court’s admission). 
 102. Coleman v. Home Depot, Inc., 306 F.3d 1333, 1344 (3d Cir. 2002) (ap-
plying the middle-max test to uphold lower court’s exclusion). 
 103. 202 F.3d 1262, 1274 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. 
BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE ¶ 403[3], at 403-25 to 403-26 (1982)). 
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conducts a Rule 403 balancing exercise, ordinarily it should 
‘give the evidence its maximum reasonable probative force and 
its minimum reasonable prejudicial value.’”104 The Eleventh 
Circuit has also recently extended the min-max test to bind dis-
trict courts as well as appellate courts.105 District courts in the 
Sixth,106 Tenth,107 and Eleventh108 Circuits have followed this 
appellate guidance and applied the min-max rule. It should be 
noted that trial court application of the min-max test might be 
less apparent than appellate application, because trial courts 
are not bound to address Rule 403 issues in a written opinion.109 
Disparate federal application of the min-max test has cre-
ated a multilayered circuit split. Circuit approaches range from 
not applying the test at all (such as in the First Circuit) to 
compelling application in both directions by both the trial and 
appellate judges (such as in the Tenth Circuit). In the following 
Part, these different approaches will be juxtaposed against the 
dueling interests of Rule 403 balancing: admissibility and dis-
cretion.  
II.  RULE 403 IN APPLICATION   
Strong policy considerations undergird both the presump-
tion of admissibility and the deferential standard of review for 
Rule 403 decisions. When appellate courts review trial court 
decisions to exclude evidence under Rule 403, however, these 
dual interests can clash. When an appellate judge must choose 
between the strong presumption of admissibility and the defer-
ential standard of review, which interest should win out? This 
Part begins to answer that question. 
Section A of this Part critiques the merits of deference to 
discretion when applied to Rule 403 decisions, especially deci-
 
 104. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 564 F. App’x 710, 715 
(4th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). 
 105. United States v. Lopez, 649 F.3d 1222, 1247 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Rule 
403 requires a court to ‘look at the evidence in a light most favorable to its 
admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its undue prejudi-
cial impact.’”). 
 106. Donathan v. Orthopaedix & Sports Med. Clinic, P.L.L.C., No. 4:07-CV-
18, 2009 WL 3584263, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 26, 2009) (citing Deters in appli-
cation of the min-max test); see also United States v. Sain, No. 07-20309, 2009 
WL 136910, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 16, 2009).  
 107. See Peshlakai v. Ruiz, No. CIV 13-0752 JB/ACT, 2014 WL 4104674, at 
*50 (D.N.M. Aug. 8, 2014). 
 108. See Ostrow v. GlobeCast Am. Inc., 825 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1274 (S.D. 
Fla. 2011). 
 109. See 22A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5224.1, at 387–89. 
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sions to exclude evidence. The inherent subjectivity of Rule 403 
decisions, the right to a trial by jury, and a comparative lack of 
informational asymmetry all counsel against excessive defer-
ence to trial court discretion in Rule 403 decisions. Section B 
describes how the decisional structure of appellate review can 
cause the two interests of Rule 403 to clash; an appellate court 
reviewing a lower court’s decision to exclude evidence under 
Rule 403 may find itself forced to choose between deferring to 
appropriate trial judge discretion and upholding the strong 
presumption of admissibility.  
A. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF DEFERENCE TO DISCRETION IN  
RULE 403 DECISIONS 
Rule 403’s breadth, the complexity of its weighing test, and 
the vague language of the rule can run counter to the ad-
vantages of abuse of discretion review, especially when the rule 
is employed to exclude evidence. The balancing of Rule 403 fac-
tors depends on a multitude of subjective impressions. These 
subjective factors cloud the Rule 403 balancing test. Further, a 
deferential standard protecting against unwarranted exclusion 
of relevant evidence could encroach on the parties’ constitu-
tional right to trial by jury. Finally, evidentiary decisions may 
not give rise to the kind of informational asymmetry that ne-
cessitates highly deferential review.  
1. Subjectivity in the Rule 403 Balancing Test 
Rule 403’s complex balancing test involves a collection of 
factors that are vaguely defined and dependent upon subjective 
estimations. Commentary suggests that the language of some 
Federal Rules of Evidence is so “amorphous” that appellate 
judges struggle to evaluate lower court decisions on their mer-
its; the broad language of the rule could be applied to support 
almost any result.110 The more vaguely defined and experience-
dependent the weighing factors of a test, the more reasonable 
minds could differ and the more likely it is that abuse of discre-
tion review is too deferential for the purposes of evidence law. 
 
 110. See id. § 5212, at 149–54; cf. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. 
KIRKPATRICK, 1 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 93 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that trial judges 
have broad discretion in weighing these factors). 
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The Rule 403 balancing test is hardly simple,111 and as one Cal-
ifornia court put it, “[p]robative value and prejudice . . . are not 
commodities subject to quantitative measurement.”112  
a. Estimating Probative Value 
Measuring probative value might seem like a simple task, 
but closer examination reveals that it is more complex. To de-
termine the probative value of a piece of evidence, the trial 
judge must evaluate how well the proffered evidence supports a 
material fact and the importance of that fact to the central is-
sues of the case.113 How does a judge decide how important a 
piece of evidence is to the proponent’s case, especially if the tri-
al is far from over? Surely she cannot take the party’s word for 
it, for the proponent has an incentive to inflate the value of the 
evidence in order to defeat the Rule 403 objection. Further 
complicating the matter, the Supreme Court instructs judges 
not to consider the evidence “as an island,” but rather in light 
of the availability of substitute sources of proof, and of the oth-
er proof offered in the case.114 So the judge must not only weigh 
the proffered evidence, but must also place it into the context of 
other evidence in the case and the web of inferences springing 
from that evidence.  
To demonstrate the difficulty of estimating probative val-
ue, consider an example. The Federal Rules of Evidence permit 
the entrance of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement, offered 
to impeach the witness’s credibility.115 Say that the plaintiff in a 
personal injury case has called Tori, an eyewitness to the car 
crash, to testify that she saw the defendant run a red light in 
his van before hitting the plaintiff’s truck. The defendant wants 
to call the bartender at Tori’s neighborhood tavern to testify 
that he overheard Tori, after a few margaritas, telling her 
friends, “That truck went right through the red light. No won-
der it got hit!” The statement cannot be offered for the truth of 
the matter asserted, unless it properly falls within a hearsay 
 
 111. 22A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5214, at 172 (“The reader 
who compares this litany of matters trial judges must consider in doing the 
balancing test with appellate opinions reviewing Rule 403 rulings will likely 
see an immense gap between the ideal and real. Indeed, some readers will 
conclude with us that the Advisory Committee’s attempt to structure discre-
tion to check ‘unbridled discretion’ has failed . . . .”); see also supra Part I.A. 
 112. People v. Schader, 457 P.2d 841, 849 (Cal. 1969). 
 113. See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text. 
 114. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 182–84 (1997). 
 115. FED. R. EVID. 613.  
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exception.116 So the defendant instead offers the prior incon-
sistent statement to demonstrate that Tori lied or misrepre-
sented the truth, either at the bar or on the witness stand. 
From that the defendant wants the jury to infer that Tori can-
not be trusted to speak honestly and, consequently, that they 
should discount her testimony entirely.117 The plaintiff objects 
under Rule 403.  
For each step in this inferential chain, the trial judge must 
weigh the probative utility. In order for the judge to quantify 
the probative value of the bartender’s testimony, she must es-
timate the degree to which the prior inconsistent statement 
implicates Tori as a liar, the likelihood that the jury will accept 
the implication that Tori is a liar, the likelihood that the jury 
will apply those doubts about Tori’s credibility to discount 
Tori’s testimony generally, and how important it is to the de-
fendant’s case that Tori’s testimony be undermined in the eyes 
of the jury. With each step in this inferential chain requiring 
estimation, the final determination of probative value could 
vary enormously depending on the judge’s perception.  
b. Estimating Prejudicial Impact 
If determining the probative value of a piece of evidence 
requires subjective evaluations, then determining the danger of 
unfair prejudice is a shot in the dark. The danger of prejudice 
can spring from juror bias, confusion about the inference that 
the jury should draw from the evidence, evidence that over-
persuades, or some other flaw suggesting decision on an im-
proper basis.118 All of these are effects that occur within the 
mind of the juror. As Professor Imwinkelried describes it, 
“[d]rawing on his knowledge of juror psychology, the judge tries 
to forecast the probable response of the typical juror to the item 
of evidence.”119 So when the trial judge evaluates the danger of 
unfair prejudice, she attempts to peek into the minds of the ju-
ry to predict their logical missteps. This is troublesome for two 
main reasons.  
 
 116. FED. R. EVID. 801–802. For the purposes of this hypothetical, assume 
that the statement is inadmissible to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  
 117. See generally 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR J. GOLD, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6202 (2d ed. 2012) (describing the policies under-
lying Rule 613). 
 118. See supra Part I.A. 
 119. Imwinkelried, supra note 9, at 895. 
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First, the judge has little more information about the jury 
than the parties in the case. She presides over voir dire and can 
observe the body language of the jury during trial proceed-
ings.120 But voir dire questions are often cursory,121 and the trial 
judge does not have access to each juror’s life story. The trial 
judge may be forced to rely on generalizations or stereotypes, 
sometimes based on race, social class, or gender, to estimate 
the effects from bias, prejudice, or inferential misstep that cer-
tain kinds of evidence could trigger.122 A rule of evidence that 
encourages such stereotyping and permits the judge to exclude 
evidence on the basis of demographic generalizations should 
not be so robustly shielded from appellate review. 
The second problem with asking the trial judge to draw 
conclusions about the prejudicial impact of the evidence in the 
minds of the jury is that trial judges have variable experience 
with, and impressions of, juries generally. What can a new 
judge do to estimate the reaction a juror will have to potentially 
prejudicial evidence? She might draw from her experience in 
practice, but depending upon the judge’s prior practice area, 
this experience could be tainted with bias for or against plain-
tiffs or corporations, prosecutors or defendants, etc. Further, 
even experienced judges are unlikely to possess a deep under-
standing of juror psychology, “something they were not taught 
in law school.”123 Judges can have profoundly varying impres-
 
 120. See 22A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5214, at 170 n.11. 
 121. See John H. Blume et al., Probing “Life Qualification” Through Ex-
panded Voir Dire, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1209, 1239–41, 1258 (2001) (suggesting 
that voir dire is often too cursory to adequately protect capital defendants); G. 
Steven Henry, The Scope of Voir Dire in Civil Cases: An Alabama Perspective, 
9 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 279, 292 (1985) (noting that “[t]oo often voir dire is 
somewhat cursory in civil cases”); cf. Smith v. Tenet Healthsystem SL, Inc., 
436 F.3d 879, 884 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating that voir dire is “proper” only if 
“there is an adequate inquiry to determine any juror bias or prejudice”).  
 122. For an example of an expert advising judges to rely on generalizations 
in Rule 403 balancing, see 22A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 7, § 5214, at 
170 (“The judge should reflect on the jury selected to hear the case. A jury 
dominated by upper-class men may believe that women cannot commit crimes 
of violence or more likely to believe that bank tellers will dip into the till. A 
jury that contains significant numbers of minority groups will be less suscep-
tible to racial stereotypes than an all-white jury.”). Reliance on conventional 
wisdom and amateur psychology provides at best a shaky foundation for quan-
tifications of prejudicial impact. See Gold, supra note 42, at 85. 
 123. Gold, supra note 42, at 85 (“In fact, the courts have frequently re-
solved Rule 403 issues by relying upon their lay assumptions about juror psy-
chology . . . . Unfortunately, many of the assumptions made by the courts seem 
at best unproven and all too frequently unsound.”). 
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sions of the rational capacities of the average juror.124 The vari-
ances in judge perceptions of juror psychology and behavior will 
result in broadly diverging estimations of prejudicial impact.  
c. Reasoning from Moral Judgments 
In many Rule 403 decisions, the judge will be required to 
make a moral conclusion, or at least perform some moral-
adjacent reasoning. Frequently, proposed evidence draws a 
Rule 403 objection because a party regards it as liable to incite 
moral indignation in the jury.125 To evaluate the prejudicial im-
pact, the trial judge must recognize something in the evidence 
that invites a moral judgment and estimate the strength of that 
moral judgment’s effect on the reasoning of the jury. This re-
quires the judge to weigh the significance of the moral value 
implicated, a subjective impression that will necessarily change 
with the experiences and perspectives of the particular judge.126 
Consider, for example, the case of United States v. Weisz, in 
which the lower court judge described a video of a congressman 
accepting a bribe as “a disgusting, revolting sight.”127 While the 
lower court judge ultimately decided not to exclude the evi-
dence,128 his severe reaction to it was likely influenced by his 
individual experiences and impressions about politicians.  
Returning to the personal injury hypothetical from above, 
suppose that the bartender testified that Tori had been drink-
ing in a seedy casino for an entire Tuesday afternoon when he 
overheard her statement. The plaintiff objects and claims that 
the jury will judge Tori for her lifestyle choices: for being intox-
icated in the middle of the day and for the association with 
gambling. This, the plaintiff argues, will cause the jury to 
doubt her credibility because of her lifestyle instead of her in-
 
 124. Compare People v. Long, 113 Cal. Rptr. 530, 536–37 (Ct. App. 1974) 
(“A juror is not some kind of dithering nincompoop . . . . Jurors are our peers, 
often as well educated, as well balanced, as stable, as experienced in the reali-
ties of life as the holders of law degrees.”), with United States v. Moccia, 681 
F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1982) (finding that the general exclusion of past bad acts 
is justified by the risk that a jury will “convict for crimes other than those 
charged—or that, uncertain of guilt, it will convict anyway because a bad per-
son deserves punishment”). 
 125. See Teneille R. Brown, The Affective Blindness of Evidence Law, 89 
DENV. U. L. REV. 47, 73–74 (2011). 
 126. Cf. Dolan, supra note 29, at 225 (“A judge’s perceptions of the goals 
and values of the prejudice rule, of course, will influence greatly a decision in 
any phase of a prejudice rule determination during trial.”). 
 127. 718 F.2d 413, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 128. See id. 
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consistent statement, an improper inference. A person’s reac-
tion to legal but socially disfavored activities like alcohol con-
sumption and gambling could depend considerably upon up-
bringing, religion, family experience, and other factors. The 
weight that the trial judge gives to plaintiff’s argument, and 
thus the judge’s estimation of the danger of prejudice, will de-
pend more upon her own opinions toward alcohol and gambling 
than on any of the jurors’ voir dire answers.129  
Anytime a judge considers the likelihood that a piece of ev-
idence will incite moral indignation, she must measure it, at 
least to some degree, against her own moral code. This is inevi-
table because she cannot look at the evidence through the eyes 
of the jury, only her own. Yet there is no way to know how 
closely the moral perceptions of the jury track with that of the 
judge, especially when the evidence never reaches the jury. 
When moral impressions are a part of the Rule 403 balancing 
test, the judge’s particular experiences and background add an 
additional layer of subjectivity. 
Vagueness, malleability, and subjectivity creep into Rule 
403 from all directions. Determining the probative value, prej-
udicial impact, and moral implications of a piece of evidence re-
quires a judge to make determinations from very little objective 
information about the proceedings, parties, or jury. When the 
judge decides to exclude otherwise relevant evidence on the ba-
sis of such a vaguely defined set of weighing factors, the appel-
late court should not overestimate the deference that abuse of 
discretion review requires. 
2. The Right to Trial by Jury 
Recognizing that entrusting factual determinations to a 
single person posed a danger of injustice, the Framers en-
shrined the right to a jury trial in the Bill of Rights.130 One of 
the jury’s roles is to safeguard against “the corrupt or overzeal-
ous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric 
judge.”131 But the unwarranted exclusion of evidence from the 
 
 129. While voir dire questions may contribute to the judge’s estimation of 
the jury’s morality, the purpose of voir dire is to ensure the selection of an im-
partial jury, not to catalog the ethics and worldview of each juror. Consequent-
ly, the questions are often general, and the trial judge has considerable discre-
tion to limit them. E.g., Nanninga v. Three Rivers Elec. Coop., 236 F.3d 902, 
906–07 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 130. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII. 
 131. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
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jury’s view undermines that safeguard,132 and abuse of discre-
tion review can operate to shield the choice of a “biased . . . or 
eccentric judge” to keep pertinent and appropriate evidence 
away from the jury.133  
In light of this constitutional right, there is something 
counterintuitive about the judge keeping evidence away from 
the jury for the jury’s own good. The constitutional right to a 
trial by jury places great trust in the jury, yet the evidence 
rules are sometimes employed as though the average juror is a 
“low grade moron[].”134 Scholarly work has pointed out that the 
right to a jury trial well preceded the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.135 When evaluating a Rule 403 objection, the trial judge 
must determine not only the importance of the evidence to the 
ultimate issue, but also the likelihood that the jury will accept 
the evidence as probative of the fact it is offered to prove. Thus, 
the judge does the jury’s reasoning for them predictively to 
evaluate a Rule 403 objection. While it is clear that Rule 403 
serves an important function, it should not be so robustly pro-
tected by deference to discretion that the exclusion of evidence 
begins to infringe on the right to trial by jury.  
3. Information Asymmetry in Appellate Review 
A reviewing court will inevitably have less access to perti-
nent information than the trial court did when it made the con-
tested decision. The appellate court can read the words that 
were spoken but cannot read the faces and demeanor of wit-
nesses or attorneys like the trial judge could.136 Additionally, 
the time that an appellate court must spend becoming familiar 
with the record can be a considerable drain on judicial re-
sources.137 This barrier between the appellate court and the fac-
tual basis for the trial court’s decision is an information asym-
metry.138  
 
 132. See generally Kenneth S. Klein, Why Federal Rule of Evidence 403 Is 
Unconstitutional, and Why That Matters, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1077 (2013) 
(questioning Rule 403’s constitutionalty given Sixth and Seventh Amendment 
guarantees to a trial by jury). 
 133. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156. 
 134. Klein, supra note 132, at 1080 (quoting Edmond M. Morgan, Foreword 
to MODEL CODE OF EVID. 8–10 (AM. LAW INST. 1942)).  
 135. Id. at 1082–94. 
 136. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 137. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 138. Anderson, supra note 69, at 44–47.  
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When it comes to evidentiary and procedural decisions, 
however, the information divide between the trial and appellate 
court is frequently less pronounced than it would be for factual 
findings. Generally, an evidence dispute will center on the par-
ticular characteristics of a single piece or source of evidence; 
this is simply the way that the evidence rules are written. Due 
to the narrow scope of evidential and procedural questions, 
“[t]he appellate court can generally inform itself of all relevant 
information about the trial court’s procedural and evidentiary 
rulings at relatively low cost.”139 When estimating prejudicial 
impact, the trial judge does have the advantage of seeing the 
reactions of the jury to evidence of the case. But common sense 
would suggest that such observation is of limited aid. Unless 
the jury was liable to audibly gasp or swoon at inflammatory 
evidence, jury observations are unlikely to provide much con-
crete information. At the very least, the problem of information 
asymmetry is less pronounced for review of Rule 403 decisions 
than it is for other trial court decisions entitled to deferential 
review.  
B. THE INTERNAL TENSION OF RULE 403 EXCLUSIONS 
Appellate review of lower Rule 403 rulings juggles the two 
main policies of the rule: a strong presumption of admissibility 
and a deferential standard of appellate review.140 Depending 
upon the nature of the lower court decision, these interests 
could either clash or harmonize. This Section examines the way 
that deference and the presumption of admissibility are in 
harmony when an appellate court reviews decisions to admit 
evidence, and the way that these interests can conflict when an 
appellate court reviews decisions to exclude evidence.  
1. Reviewing Decisions To Admit 
Most Rule 403 decisions should be decisions to admit the 
contested evidence. Given the broad applicability of the rule,141 
a savvy litigator has little to lose from raising the objection now 
 
 139. Id. at 17; cf. Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making 
Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope 
of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. 
REV. 993, 1040 (1986) (“The number of pages in the record relevant to proce-
dural rulings also should ordinarily be fewer than those relevant to determi-
nations going to the merits. Hence, the time required for free review of proce-
dural questions will not ordinarily be as great as for substantive ones.”).  
 140. See supra Part I.  
 141. See supra Part I.A. 
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and then during the course of a trial. But the steep presump-
tion should result in many more overruled Rule 403 objections 
than sustained ones.142 Accordingly, most appellate review of 
Rule 403 decisions should be for decisions to admit evidence.143 
In these reviews, the appellate court must decide if the trial 
court abused its discretion in preserving the rule’s presumption 
of admissibility.  
The appellate court could come to one of three conclusions, 
in each of which the twin interests of Rule 403 are in harmony. 
First, the appellate court could decide that the lower court 
made the correct decision to admit the evidence. The decision 
does not implicate discretion because the appellate court agrees 
with the trial court. Second, the appellate court could find that 
the risk of prejudice justified excluding the evidence, but that 
the trial court’s decision to admit it was not so irrational that it 
abused its discretion.144 In this case, the appellate court will af-
firm, protecting both the trial court’s discretion and the Rules’ 
strong preference for admissibility. The third option is to find 
that the trial court exceeded its discretion in admitting the evi-
dence because the evidence was so prejudicial as to clearly 
overcome the presumption. In this last circumstance, the trial 
judge’s decision is not entitled to support from the deferential 
standard of review or from the presumption of admissibility. 
Neither governs because the trial court’s decision has exceeded 
the scope of reasonable discretion and, as a result, is not enti-
tled to the deference, and because the prejudicial impact of the 
evidence has overcome the presumption of admissibility. The 
appellate court, when reviewing a Rule 403 admission, will 
never be forced to choose between the interests of discretion 
and admissibility; the trial court will have violated neither or 
both.145  
 
 142. See 1 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, ¶ 403[01], at 403-9 (Rel. 47-
7/93) (“Since trial judges are granted such a powerful tool by Rule 403, they 
must take special care to use it sparingly.”); see also supra Part I.B. 
 143. Another reason that more appeals will challenge the admission of evi-
dence concerns the dynamics of criminal prosecution. A criminal defendant is 
more likely to be damaged by a decision to admit damning evidence than a de-
cision to exclude helpful evidence and is also more likely to pursue every rea-
sonable opportunity to appeal (because of a personal stake in the outcome). Cf. 
Anderson, supra note 69, at 26 (“[C]riminal defendants tend to appeal using a 
kitchen sink approach.”).  
 144. See supra Part I.C. 
 145. See infra Figure 1 for further illustration.  
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2. Reviewing Decisions To Exclude 
Appellate review of trial court decisions to exclude evidence 
under Rule 403 is more complicated. Once again, the appellate 
court could come to one of three conclusions. First, the appel-
late court could find that the trial court made the correct deci-
sion to exclude the evidence. In that case, the two interests do 
not clash because the appellate court agrees with the trial court 
that the presumption of admissibility was rebutted.  
The second possibility is that the appellate court thinks 
that the trial court acted irrationally and unreasonably in ex-
cluding the evidence and thus abused its discretion. In this 
case, the presumption of admissibility is not in direct conflict 
with discretion, because the trial court abused that discretion 
and is no longer entitled to deference. This will be a rare occur-
rence, however, because abuse of discretion review is highly 
deferential.146  
The final possibility, and the most troublesome one, occurs 
if the appellate court concludes that the danger of prejudice has 
not properly overcome the presumption of admissibility, but 
fails to find an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to 
exclude. This means that the appellate court, were it in the 
shoes of the trial judge at the time of decision, would have ad-
mitted the evidence. However, the appellate court does not find 
that the trial judge acted irrationally; the decision to exclude 
was within the scope of reasonable choices.147 In this circum-
stance, the two interests of Rule 403 clash. The appellate court 
must choose either to uphold the presumption of admissibility 
or to adhere to the principle of deference to trial court discre-
tion. As described below, this third scenario becomes impossible 
if the appellate court, but not the trial court, applies the min-
max test. If that is the case, then the two courts are looking at 
a different range of options.148 If the trial judge makes a deci-
sion that falls outside of the min-max framework but still rea-
sonably balances the factors, the reviewing court must choose 
either to respect the trial judge’s discretion or to respect the 
presumption of admissibility, with little guidance of which 
should trump.  
Considerations of subjectivity, right to a trial by jury, and 
informational symmetry undermine the value of deference to 
 
 146. See supra Part I.C. 
 147. See supra Part I.C. 
 148. See infra Figure 2. 
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discretion in Rule 403 decisions. When appellate courts review 
trial court decisions to exclude evidence, however, appellate 
courts may be forced to choose between honoring the principle 
of deference to discretion and preserving the strong presump-
tion of admissibility. In those circumstances, this Note posits 
that the presumption of admissibility should win out.  
III.  RULE 403 MAXIMIZED   
This Part describes the effect of the min-max test on the 
internal tension of Rule 403. As described above, the possibility 
of a clash between the twin interests of Rule 403 arises when 
appellate courts review trial court decisions to exclude evidence 
under the rule. Depending upon the pattern of its application, 
the min-max test could either instruct appellate courts to pre-
serve the presumption of admissibility over deference to discre-
tion, or it could provide no meaningful guidance while causing 
the appellate court to view the evidence from a wholly different 
framework than the trial court. The former of these options 
would best serve the interests of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
The latter is irrational. Accordingly, the federal rules ought to 
be amended to require the former result; the most logical for-
mulation of the min-max test should be uniformly adopted by 
statute.  
A. APPLYING THE MIN-MAX TEST TO THE INTERNAL TENSION  
OF RULE 403 
When an appellate court reviews a trial court decision to 
exclude evidence under Rule 403, the presumption of admissi-
bility can clash with the principle of deference to trial court dis-
cretion.149 Depending upon the circumstances in which a circuit 
applies the min-max test, the test may provide guidance to the 
reviewing court regarding which of the two interests should 
trump. The following Section examines the impact of different 
min-max test configurations on appellate review of only deci-
sions to exclude evidence.  
 
 149. See supra Part II.B. 
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1. Appellate Application to Admissions Only  
When the appellate court applies the min-max test only to 
review admissions of evidence, and not to review exclusions,150 
the result is that deference to discretion will trump the strong 
presumption of admissibility. The trial court is only required to 
perform the balancing test within the bounds of reason, a 
measure that could diverge drastically from the appellate 
court’s application of the same test. Even if the trial and appel-
late courts come down on different sides of the “substantially 
outweighed” tipping point, abuse of discretion review instructs 
the appellate court to affirm.  
The following original graphic represents the range of 
permissible conclusions for each court: 
Fig. 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the circumstance that Figure 1 represents, the trial 
court’s decision to exclude the evidence was still within the 
range of reasonable balancing, even though the appellate court 
would have struck the balance differently. Because the trial 
court did not act irrationally as defined by the framework of 
reasonable balancing, the appellate court must defer to its dis-
cretion.  
2. Universal Appellate Application 
When the appellate court applies the min-max test to both 
admissions and exclusions of evidence under Rule 403, but the 
 
 150. The Seventh Circuit applies this permutation of the test. See supra 
notes 93–94 and accompanying text. It is unclear whether the Fourth Circuit 
applies the min-max test to both exclusions and admissions, or only to admis-
sions. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
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trial court does not apply the min-max test,151 the result is 
muddled. The trial and appellate courts could miss each other, 
because they are using a different set of scales to evaluate the 
evidence. The min-max test narrows the scope of reasonable 
conclusions by strengthening the presumption of admissibility. 
Instead of estimating the prejudicial impact within the scope of 
reason, the judge must estimate the minimum prejudicial im-
pact within the scope of reason. The same goes for the proba-
tive value—the scope of reasonable conclusions on the maxi-
mum probative value is narrower than the scope of reasonable 
conclusions on the possible probative value. A perplexing dis-
connect results when only the appellate court applies the min-
max test. The following graphic illustrates that disconnect. 
Fig. 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How should the appellate court resolve this? The answer is 
not immediately apparent. The trial court’s decision, viewed 
through the lens of the min-max test, was unreasonable and 
thus constitutes an abuse of discretion. But the trial court was 
not applying the min-max test, and its resolution of the balanc-
ing test is not unreasonable if viewed outside the confines of 
that test. So can it really have abused its discretion? The clash 
between deference and the presumption of admissibility is most 
apparent and troubling when the appellate court, but not the 
trial court, applies the min-max test. 
 
 151. The Second and Fifth Circuits meet this description. See supra notes 
97–98, 102 and accompanying text. The Sixth Circuit might also be placed in 
this category, but its precise classification is unclear as at least two district 
courts from the Sixth Circuit have also applied the min-max test at the trial 
level. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
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3. Universal Trial Court and Appellate Application 
When both the trial and appellate courts apply the min-
max test,152 they are once again viewing the evidence on the 
same plane. Both courts will employ the test to tilt the Rule 
403 balancing towards admission, thereby respecting the pre-
sumption of admissibility created by the rule. But the narrow 
scope of reasonable outcomes under the min-max test reduces 
the likelihood that the appellate court will find itself torn be-
tween deference and admissibility. When both the appellate 
court and trial court apply the min-max test, the conflict caused 
by appellate review of Rule 403 decisions is minimized. Illus-
trated: 
Fig. 3 
 
The appellate court in this circumstance does not have to 
decide between honoring deference and honoring the presump-
tion, because the trial court has violated the scope of discretion. 
The min-max test narrows the scope of reasonable choices so 
that the appellate court is less likely to disagree with the trial 
court’s reasonable exercise of discretion.  
B. UNIFYING THE FRAMEWORK OF RULE 403 DECISIONS 
The multilayered circuit split in application of the min-max 
test unduly complicates the structure of appellate review of 
Rule 403 decisions. The problem is most salient when an appel-
late court reviews a lower court’s decision to exclude evidence 
 
 152. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, and possibly also the Fourth and 
Sixth Circuits, have followed this approach. Compare supra notes 95, 99–101 
and accompanying text (noting that these circuits have applied the min-max 
test to both exclusions and admissions under Rule 403), with supra notes 103–
04, 106, 108 and accompanying text (suggesting that these circuits may apply 
the min-max test at both the trial and appellate level). 
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under Rule 403.153 If the appellate court, but not the trial court, 
views the decision through the lens of the min-max test, then 
the two courts are trying to answer fundamentally different 
questions. The appellate court could be forced to choose be-
tween upholding the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence and adhering to the abuse of discretion standard of re-
view. In its current formulation, Rule 403 provides little guid-
guidance to the appellate court on which principle to choose.  
This Note posits that the strong presumption of admissibil-
ity should trump the principle of deference to discretion in 
those circumstances where they strongly conflict. Rule 403 is 
an “extraordinary” solution that should be used “sparingly.”154 
When the trial judge uses the rule to exclude evidence, then 
more stringent appellate review is warranted. The abuse of dis-
cretion standard of review often underserves the interests of 
justice when applied to review of Rule 403 decisions.155 Unique 
characteristics of Rule 403, such as its relative lack of infor-
mation asymmetry and its tendency to require moral-adjacent 
reasoning, invite greater scrutiny of the trial judge’s subjective 
impressions.156 The min-max test, when applied at both the tri-
al and appellate levels, appropriately directs the reviewing 
court to uphold the presumption of admissibility over deference 
to discretion.  
Universal and unequivocal adoption of the min-max test 
would resolve the ideological clash in appellate review of Rule 
403 decisions without unduly undermining traditional trial 
judge discretion. It is an apt compromise. Most circuits have 
recognized the advantages of the min-max test in some form, 
but the wide disparities in application unnecessarily confuse 
the issue.157 The solution is to amend the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence to explicitly endorse the min-max test. The Rules Ena-
bling Act, by which Congress authorized the creation of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, lays down a procedure for amending 
 
 153. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 154. United States v. Joseph, 530 F. App’x 911, 922 (11th Cir. 2013) (quot-
ing United States v. Elkins, 885 F.2d 775, 784 (11th Cir. 1989)); see also PBM 
Prods., L.L.C. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 124 (4th Cir. 2011); 
Imwinkelried, supra note 9. 
 155. See supra Part II.A. 
 156. See supra Parts II.A.1, II.A.3. 
 157. See supra Part I.D. 
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such rules.158 After the advisory committee on the Rules of Evi-
dence votes to initiate an amendment, the proposed amend-
ments undergo several rounds of public notice and comment.159 
After notice and comment, the amendment requires final ap-
proval by a series of committees and a waiting period during 
which the Supreme Court or Congress could intervene in the 
amendment process.160 The process takes a few years and has 
been used several times to amend the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence since their original adoption, most recently in 2014.161  
Amending Rule 403 could be as simple of a matter as add-
ing a sentence to the advisory committee notes, specifically en-
couraging courts to always assume the maximum reasonable 
probative value and minimum reasonable prejudicial impact of 
a piece of evidence.162 Because the advisory notes are designed 
to clarify the intention behind the rules, this approach may be 
less controversial and easier to effect. A more robust option is 
to amend the text of Rule 403 itself to structure the balancing 
around the min-max test: 
Current text: The court may exclude relevant evidence if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of 
the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the 
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 
evidence.163 
Proposed text: The court may exclude relevant evidence if its max-
imum reasonable probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
minimum reasonable danger of one or more of the following: unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, 
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. 
 
 158. James C. Duff, How the Rulemaking Process Works: Overview for the 
Bench, Bar, and Public, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules 
-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking-process-works/overview 
-bench-bar-and-public (last visited Mar. 22, 2016); see also Rules Enabling Act 
of 1934, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2012). 
 159. Duff, supra note 158.  
 160. See id. 
 161. See id. For a comprehensive list of past and pending amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, see Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, FED. EVIDENCE REV., http://www.federalevidence.com/changing 
-rules#background (last visited Mar. 22, 2016), and FRE Legislative History 
Overview Resource Page, FED. EVIDENCE REV., http://www.federalevidence 
.com/node/638 (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).  
 162. The sentence might read: “When applying Rule 403, all courts should 
assume the maximum reasonable probative value of the evidence and the min-
imum reasonable prejudicial impact of the evidence.” 
 163. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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Regardless of how it is implemented, universal adoption of the 
min-max test would serve the interests of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.  
Universal adoption of the min-max test is an efficient way 
to balance the dueling interests of liberal admissibility and def-
erence to trial court discretion, because it reaffirms the liberal 
thrust of the Federal Rules of Evidence by building upon a 
growing trend. Further, it will unify the application of the rule, 
remedying the split that continues to divide the circuits. Appel-
late review best serves its purpose when the appellate court 
and the trial court are on the same page. Unifying the applica-
tion of the min-max test in one fell swoop by amending the text 
of Rule 403 would quickly and efficiently guide trial and appel-
late courts to the same page in Rule 403 balancing. The best 
way to serve the interests of Rule 403, and the Rules of Evi-
dence overall, is to codify an appropriately weighted version of 
the balancing test: the min-max test.  
  CONCLUSION   
Rule 403’s strong presumption of admissibility embodies 
the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The rule 
gives the trial judge discretion to exclude evidence if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue de-
lay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evi-
dence. Rule 403’s robust presumption of admissibility can come 
into conflict with the deferential abuse of discretion standard 
that appellate courts must apply when reviewing evidentiary 
decisions. To reconcile this conflict, several circuits have adopt-
ed the min-max test, as developed in Weinstein and Burger’s 
treatise. Applying the min-max test, a court balances the max-
imum reasonable probative value against the minimum rea-
sonable prejudicial impact of a piece of evidence. The min-max 
test stays true to the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, but a multilayered circuit split undermines its impact.  
When appellate courts review lower court decisions to ex-
clude evidence under Rule 403, the twin interests of admissibil-
ity and deference conflict. This is especially true when the ap-
pellate court, but not the trial court, applies the min-max test. 
In that circumstance, the appellate court looks at the probative 
value and prejudice of the evidence from a narrower framework 
than that of the trial court. The best way to resolve that ten-
sion, and to stay true to the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules 
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of Evidence, is to require both the trial and appellate court to 
apply the min-max test. Amending Rule 403 to explicitly bind 
all trial and appellate courts to the min-max test would pre-
serve the federal rules’ spirit of broad admissibility while main-
taining the appropriate amount of trial court discretion; it is a 
worthy and necessary compromise between the dueling inter-
ests of Rule 403.  
 
